There is a question that unifies several recent debates in epistemology, namely whether there are any essentially diachronic norms of rationality, or whether all fundamental norms of rationality are temporally local. Let us say that fans of temporally local norms advocate time-slice epistemology, where at a first pass, we define this theory as the combination of two claims. The first claim: what is rationally permissible or obligatory for you at some time is entirely determined by what mental states you are in at that time. This supervenience claim governs facts about the rationality of your actions, as well as the rationality of your full beliefs and your degreed belief states.
most of your time slices are rational. The point is just that rationality is not fundamentally predicated of you, but of your time slices. In a nutshell: time slices are the fundamental subjects of epistemic evaluation. 2 Time-slice epistemology may initially seem to have plenty of counterintuitive consequences. Say you see your friend Alice eat four scoops of ice cream for lunch, and after lunch you form the belief that she has not eaten anything all day. This seems like a perfectly good example of an irrational belief. Say you yourself eat seven scoops of ice cream for lunch, even though you are going to regret your binge as soon as it is over. This seems like a perfectly good example of an irrational action. In both cases, it is tempting to say that you are irrational precisely because there is no connection between your past mental states and what you currently believe, or between your future mental states and what you are currently doing. Hence these cases may seem like counterexamples to time-slice epistemology.
But the cases are not counterexamples. The time-slice epistemologist agrees that you are irrational in these cases, just not that you are irrational in virtue of ignoring what you used to believe or what you will later desire. The idea behind the theory is that you are irrational in virtue of ignoring your current beliefs and desires. For instance, you currently remember seeing Alice eat ice cream, and that is why it is irrational for you to believe that she has not eaten anything. You currently care about whether you are happy later, which is why it is irrational for you to do something that you believe will make you unhappy later. In more generality, the idea behind time-slice epistemology is that the current normative import of your past and future mental states is entirely mediated by your current mental states. This paper is programmatic in nature, with two very general goals. First, I want to tie together several epistemological theories by identifying them as theories that advance time-slice epistemology. This goal is addressed in the first section of the paper, where I define and motivate time-slice epistemology.
Second, I want to suggest that analogies with ethical claims can help us defend certain time-slice theories, namely time-slice theories of action under indeterminacy.
In §2, I discuss several theories about how you should act when the outcome of your decision depends on some indeterminate claim. I start with Caprice, a theory of action under indeterminacy defended in Williams 2013 . Caprice says how agents should act in isolated, one-off decision situations. Caprice follows from a more complete theory, Liberal, that also says how agents should act when they face multiple decision 2. The initial statement of time-slice epistemology should make it clear that the theory is not committed to perdurantism. In the context of this paper, claims about time slices are merely convenient shorthand for claims about agents that instantiate certain properties at times, such as being in particular mental states or being permitted to do particular actions.
situations over time. Liberal is a time-slice theory. In §3, I defend it against objections. In particular, I defend Liberal against general objections to time-slice theories by comparing it with compelling ethical claims.
Although Caprice and Liberal are compelling, they are not perfect. In §4, I raise some objections to these theories. In light of these objections, I develop alternative theories of action under indeterminacy in §5. Here again, I rely on useful analogies with ethical claims as I develop more robust principles in support of time-slice epistemology.
Defining and motivating time-slice epistemology
Time-slice epistemology replaces diachronic norms of rationality with synchronic norms, norms that say what is rational for individual time slices when they have particular mental states. The most obvious target of the time-slice epistemologist is the classic updating norm introduced by Bayes 1763 and widely adopted by Bayesians,
namely the claim that agents should update their credences according to Conditionalization. Conditionalization demands that your later credence in a proposition should match your earlier conditional credence in that proposition, conditional on any information you have since learned. The norm is at odds with time-slice epistemology, as it says your current credences are rationally constrained by your past credences, on which your current mental states need not supervene.
As time-slice epistemologists, our case against Conditionalization begins with the observation that, as Williamson 2000 put it, "forgetting is not irrational; it is just unfortunate" (219). There may be meaningful epistemic norms that require your memory to be perfect. But these are not norms of rationality in the ordinary sense. If you forgot what you ate for dinner last night, we might criticize you-but not by saying, 'how irrational of you!' In the context of an argument about whether Alice is a rational person, it is not obviously relevant to mention that she is forgetful. Intuitively, rational requirements on evidence retention are more similar to requirements on evidence gathering. Being negligent about what you learn or remember may signal or constitute irrationality. This is especially the case for strategic negligence, e.g. if you selectively forget or fail to gather evidence that disconfirms your favorite theory. But just as you are not irrational merely for having imperfect powers of evidence gathering, you are not irrational for having imperfect powers of evidence retention. 3
In more generality, the problem is that on our traditional understanding of Conditionalization, the norm requires that evidence is cumulative for rational agents, whereas intuitively, rationality does not impose such strict demands. In fact, sometimes it imposes contrary demands. In the Shangri La case in Arntzenius 2003, an agent is rationally required to violate Conditionalization, rather than remaining certain of a proposition for which she lacks sufficient evidence.
There are two very different strategies for responding to these challenges for Conditionalization. The first strategy is to simply modify the diachronic norm with some restrictions. Titelbaum 2013 suggests this approach when he says that "the domain of applicability of the Conditionalization-based framework is limited to the sorts of stories that originally motivated it: stories in which all the doxastic events are pure learning events" (124). In fact, some theorists claim that this restriction is already implicitly understood in traditional discussions of the updating norm. For instance, Schervish et al. 2004 respond to the examples in Arntzenius 2003 by complaining that certain "restrictions or limitations" are "already assumed as familiar" when Conditionalization is applied, and that these restrictions include the constraint that agents not lose information over time (316).
The second strategy for responding to challenges for Conditionalization is to trade in this diachronic norm for a synchronic norm that will yield its intuitive verdicts, but also yield the right verdicts about cases of memory loss. For instance,
Williamson 2000 argues that "a theory of evidential probability can keep separate track of evidence and still preserve much of the Bayesian framework" (220). According to Williamson, your current credences are not constrained by your past credences, but by your current evidence. At any given time, your current credence in a proposition should match the prior conditional probability of that proposition, conditional on your current evidence. The prior probability distribution is a distinguished measure of "something like the intrinsic plausibility of hypotheses prior to investigation" (211), and your current evidence is just your current knowledge (185). Since knowledge is not necessarily cumulative for rational agents, this proposal answers challenges involving rational memory loss. Since your current mental states include your current knowledge, this proposal advances time-slice epistemology.
The same strategies can be used to respond to other challenges to Conditionalization. For instance, it is a familiar observation that without forgetting anything, rational agents can start out certain that some de se proposition is false, and then later have some credence in that same proposition. For example: you may rationally be sure that it is not yet after midnight, and then later have some credence that it is after midnight. This sort of rational credal change is incompatible with Conditionalization as it is traditionally stated. Again, there are two strategies for responding to the challenge. Some theorists simply restrict the diachronic norm. For instance, Titelbaum 2013 endorses "Limited Conditionalization," which "looks exactly like Conditionalization, except that it applies only when [an agent] retains all certainties at the later time that she had at the earlier time" (124). By contrast, time-slice epistemologists will again trade in Conditionalization for a synchronic norm, one that yields the right verdicts about cases of de se updating. For instance, the theory of updating defended in Moss 2012 constrains your current credences in de se propositions using only facts about your current mental states, namely your current memories and your current opinions about the passage of time. To sum up so far: in response to counterexamples to diachronic norms, we can simply restrict those norms so that they do not apply in cases where they would yield bad results. Or we can come up with alternative synchronic norms that yield intuitive verdicts in the challenging cases.
All else being equal, the second strategy wins. From the point of view of theory building, the repeated restriction of diachronic norms is unsatisfying. The simplest diachronic norm would say that your present opinions should match your past opinions. But this norm fails when you have more information than your past self, or less information than your past self, or different de se information than your past self. what is rational for you might depend on your current mental states. As we have seen so far, we can define time-slice epistemology as the claim that the fundamental norms of rationality are synchronic, grounding the rationality of your current states and actions in facts about your current mental states. Second, what is rational for you might depend on very general relations that hold between your current self and your past and future selves. In particular, these relations might be general enough that they hold not just between distinct temporal parts of a single agent, but between distinct agents. Hence we could alternatively define time-slice epistemology as the claim that the fundamental norms of rationality are impersonal, so that your rationality is grounded in facts about normative relations that hold between persons as well as between temporal parts of persons. The handle 'time-slice epistemology' is better suited for the first theory, but not entirely unfit for the second. Compare: the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission confers meaningful legal status on corporations by conceiving of them as subjects of legal norms traditionally reserved for persons. The second notion of time-slice epistemology confers meaningful epistemic status on temporal parts of persons by conceiving of them as subjects of epistemic norms traditionally reserved for persons. By featuring in fundamental epistemic norms, time slices play a more significant role in our theorizing about rational belief and action.
Like our first notion, our second notion of time-slice epistemology has been defended in recent literature. For instance, Christensen 1991 observes that distinct agents are not rationally required to have beliefs that cohere with each other simply because they are guaranteed to lose money otherwise, and he concludes that the same goes for distinct time slices of individuals: "the guaranteed betting losses suffered by those who violate Conditionalization have no philosophical significance" (246). Hedden 2013a expands on this conclusion, arguing that we should treat distinct time slices like distinct agents in many cases where their collective action is against their collective interest. Hedden 2013b advocates "moving to an independently motivated picture of rationality which treats any intrapersonal requirements of rationality as deriving from more general requirements that apply equally in the interpersonal case" Reflection says roughly that if it is given that you will later have some particular credence in a proposition as a result of rationally updating on veridical evidence, then you should already have that very credence in that proposition. This norm naturally follows from an impersonal norm. Suppose that you are certain that some agent with all your evidence has rationally updated on some additional veridical evidence. Then given that she has some particular credence in a proposition, you should have that very credence in that proposition. This norm applies whether the agent in question is someone else or some other time slice of yourself. In developing this impersonal replacement for Reflection, we are not advancing our first notion of time-slice epistemology, as each of the norms just considered is synchronic. But we are advancing the second notion of time-slice epistemology, and thereby addressing many of the same concerns that motivated our earlier rejection of diachronic norms.
In addition to synchronic personal norms, some theorists may accept impersonal norms that are essentially diachronic in the intrapersonal case. Burge 1993 is one example. Burge argues that getting information from your past self is like getting information from other agents, as both memory and testimony involve "purely preservative" processes that directly transfer justification from one self to another. Suppose you have a justified belief and that I get this belief from you by testimony. 4. A referee worries that some norms govern "movements of mind," such as the norm requiring you to change your beliefs when they are inconsistent. But the point of time-slice epistemology is that we can derive such requirements from synchronic, impersonal norms. It is a fundamental fact that you are required to have consistent beliefs. This fact entails the less fundamental fact that you must reject some of your earlier beliefs when those beliefs were inconsistent, just as you must reject inconsistent beliefs held by others. 5. For readers skeptical about whether there are any genuinely indeterminate decision situations, the arguments of this paper may be more felicitously applied to situations where agents have imprecise credences about facts relevant to their decisions (cf. §3). 6. For simplicity, I assume throughout that agents are certain of the relevant details of their decision situations. In order to sidestep concerns about whether you could spend 10 dollars before entering the Cabinet, we could imagine the broker adding or subtracting from your immediate felt pleasure rather than from your bank account.
Standard decision theory does not answer the question for you. Williams argues that a complete account of indeterminacy should tell you how to respond to the broker, i.e. which if any responses are permissible, and which if any are obligatory.
The decision theory defended in Williams 2013 yields a straightforward verdict about the broker case, namely that it is okay for you to take the investment, and okay for you to reject it. In fact, when it comes to isolated, one-off decision situations, the decision theory is simple. In any case where the supervaluationist says that some indeterminate claim has multiple sharpenings, it is permissible for you to act as if any of those sharpenings is certainly correct. In other words:
(Caprice) An isolated action is currently permissible for you just in case there is some sharpening such that the action has highest expected utility according to your current utility function and your current conditional credence function, conditional on that sharpening being correct.
In the Cabinet case, the indeterminate claim relevant for your decision is the claim that you are identical with Omega. The claim has two sharpenings: either you are Omega, or you are not. The first sharpening sanctions your taking the investment.
The second sanctions your rejecting it. Hence we may conclude that either action is permissible for you. 7
Caprice is restricted to isolated decisions, cases where an indeterminate claim is relevant for your decision but has never before been relevant for any others. Hence
Caprice is not a complete decision theory, because it does not yield verdicts about diachronic decision cases. Say that after you accept or reject the investment, the broker offers you a loan. He will immediately pay you 15 dollars, in exchange for charging There are multiple ways of extending Caprice into a more complete decision theory. For instance, our complete theory may say that your previous decision does not constrain your current rational actions. To state the norm precisely, let us say that an action is currently sanctioned by a sharpening for you just in case it maximizes util-7. There is a further complication in the theory defended in Williams 2013, namely that strictly speaking, your action must be randomly chosen from among the actions sanctioned by sharpenings. This complication does not affect my arguments, and so I will set it aside for sake of simplicity.
ity according to your current utility function and your current conditional credence function, conditional on that sharpening. Then we may extend Caprice as follows:
(Liberal) An action is permissible just in case it is sanctioned by some sharpening.
This norm is implicitly indexed: an action is permissible for an agent at a time, and a sharpening sanctions an action for an agent at a time. According to Liberal, the condition mentioned in Caprice is necessary and sufficient for the permissibility of any action.
By contrast, we could instead expand Caprice by saying that if you rejected the investment, you cannot also reject the loan. This extension of Caprice is inspired by the following three claims in Williams 2013:
[A]gents should strive to make their actions dynamically permissible. (16) We call an action dynamically permissible at time t just in case it maximizes utility on some sharpening live at the score at t.
When an action is carried out that is permissible on some but not all sharpenings, the score updates by eliminating those on which it is not permissible. (16) Here is one interpretation of these passages: let us say that a sharpening is live for you just in case it sanctioned all of your past actions at the time at which you did them.
Then we may extend Caprice as follows:
(Restrictive) An action is permissible just in case it is sanctioned by some live sharpening.
Like Liberal, Restrictive is implicitly indexed. In particular, a sharpening is live for an agent at a time. The idea is simple: if your previous actions were sanctioned by some sharpenings but not others, then an action is currently permissible for you just in case it is consistent with how you acted before. If you rejected the investment earlier, then also rejecting the loan is not sanctioned by a live sharpening, and so it is not dynamically permissible, and so you should not do it. There are two natural ways of implementing Restrictive. The set of live sharpenings may be independent of your current mental states, in which case Restrictive will clearly conflict with our first notion of time-slice epistemology. By contrast, it may be that your current mental states are rationally constrained so that they determine which sharpenings are currently live for you. For instance, it may be that your opinions about indeterminate propositions are rationally constrained to evolve over time in a way that reflects how you have already acted on those propositions. In that case, Restrictive will be compatible with our first notion of time-slice epistemology, since which actions are permissible for you will supervene on facts about your current mental states. But that is only because we will have accepted another constraint incompatible with time-slice epistemology: which opinions are rationally permissible for you will not supervene on facts about your current mental states, but will be partly determined by independent facts about how you have acted before. Hence either way, fans of Restrictive will end up endorsing some norm at odds with our first notion of time-slice epistemology. The same goes for our second notion. Restrictive There are a couple of arguments against Liberal that have nothing to do with betting. These arguments are scarce in print but common in conversation, and so they merit some discussion here. The first argument is that it could not be rational to first act according to one sharpening and next according to another, without some reason for changing how you act. If you first act as if you will survive the Cabinet, for instance, then you cannot start to act otherwise for no good reason. This argument may seem compelling, until we observe that similar reasoning yields conclusions that contradict standard principles of decision theory. It is widely accepted that if multiple actions each have maximal expected utility, then each of the actions is permissible, regardless of whether you have chosen between just these actions before. It is permissible to act one way and then another, with no reason for changing how you act.
Since some groundless switching between alternatives is permissible, it cannot be that Liberal is incorrect merely in virtue of permitting some groundless switching.
In addition, it is not clear why the argument under consideration is any better than an analogous argument for the opposite conclusion, namely that you cannot rationally keep acting in the same way without some reason for continuing to act that way. The fact that you acted some way before has no intrinsic epistemic significance. This pragmatic argument depends on the claim that it is impermissible for informed agents to forego sure money. But on reflection, this claim is not so clear.
In fact, sometimes it seems that we ought to be forgiving of agents who forego sure gains. The most familiar examples of this phenomenon do not involve agents who are torn between beliefs, but agents who are torn between values. 11 To take an example from Sartre 1946: you must either join the Free French as a soldier in England, or stay home to care for your ailing mother. Suppose that after several days of agonizing reflection, you board a train for England. But on the train, you have a change of heart.
The situation has not changed, i.e. you have just the same evidence and just the same values as you did the day before. But you regret joining the army, and you feel resolved to care for your mother. In this situation, it seems perfectly permissible for you to get off the train to England and head home. In the literature on moral dilemmas, several authors aim to predict this sort of result. Raz 1997 argues that when facing moral dilemmas, "we are within our rights to change our minds" (119). Broome 2000 argues that you may "make the best of a bad job" in such situations (34). It is true that if you return home, you could have done better overall. Instead of buying train tickets, you could have saved your money and definitely come out ahead. But that does not mean that you are inextricably bound to your decision from the moment you board any train.
The same goes for situations where you are deeply torn between options, not because you are torn between values, but because you are torn between beliefs. For example, suppose that your friend is vacationing out of the country, and that some horrible wildfires have started to destroy the city where he lives. There are several family photograph albums in his apartment and several valuable manuscripts in his university office. It is impossible for you to save both, and impossible for you to contact your friend to ask which he would prefer you to save. Suppose that after several minutes of agonizing reflection, you board a subway train for his office. But on the train, you change your mind. The situation has not changed, i.e. you have just the same evidence about your friend as you did before. But you regret heading for the manuscripts, and you have made up your mind that your friend would rather "ensures that at least one of Elga's bets will always be chosen by any agent using any reasonable decision rule" (316). you save the photographs. In this situation, it seems perfectly permissible for you to head for his apartment. It is intuitively permissible even if it means that you end up eating the cost of your subway ticket. The ticket is a sunk cost, and you may rationally ignore it. If this intuitive judgment is right, it is not always impermissible for informed agents to forego sure money. 12 To sum up so far: there are many ways to be deeply torn between options. Agents may be torn between values or between beliefs, and they may be torn between beliefs because they have limited evidence or because they recognize that there is no fact of the matter about some question. It is not clear that agents in these situations are strictly forbidden from changing their minds. In fact, we are intuitively disposed to forgive some agents who forego sure money, even when their change of heart is not prompted by any change in their evidence. I do not mean to suggest that the moral dilemmas literature univocally supports our intuitions about the above cases. For instance, Chang 1997b argues that rational agents cannot have incommensurable values, precisely on the grounds that practical reason prohibits agents from being "merit pumps" (11). But it is telling that Chang focuses on an example in which an agent accepts unfortunate trades with no hesitation or reflection. In general, we are most inclined to reject apparent mind changing as irrational when it happens quickly, unreflectively, repeatedly, or for strategic reasons. These intuitions can be comfortably accommodated by a theory according to which changing your mind is not itself impermissible, namely because the salient features of these cases may provide evidence that they do not involve the same sort of genuine changes of mind exhibited by agents in the Sartre case and the wildfire case. By contrast, it is more difficult for blanket injunctions against mind changing to accommodate the intuition that changing your mind can sometimes be okay. 13
From a third-person perspective, we sometimes forgive agents for changing their minds. But there is one special sense in which mind changing never seems permissible. From a situated first-person perspective, changing your mind may seem wrong for first-order reasons. For instance, it may seem that you should not change your opinion about a proposition because you would then have the wrong opinion about 12. To clarify the dialectic: some theorists accept that your evidence uniquely determines which precise credence function you should have. Fans of this uniqueness claim have a ready response to pragmatic arguments against Liberal, namely that rational agents are never in situations where Liberal recommends foregoing sure money. The point of the present discussion is that Liberal and similar time-slice theories can and should be accepted even by those who reject the uniqueness claim. 13. The arguments here and in Moss 2014 are limited: rather than arguing that mind changing is always permissible, I defend mind changing against norms that say that it is never permissible. This defense is incompatible with blanket injunctions against mind changing, but compatible with more nuanced theories according to which rational agents can have mental states that preclude mind changing. 
Developing arguments against Caprice
Liberal is a promising theory of action under indeterminacy. But it is not perfect.
Recall that Liberal entails Caprice, namely that an action is permissible in an isolated decision situation just in case it is sanctioned by some sharpening. Williams 2013
credits Elga with raising a problem for a close cousin of this latter principle. 15 Suppose that the broker offers you the same investment as before, only now he also offers you a third option. Instead of immediately accepting or rejecting the investment, you may choose to delay your decision. If you delay, the broker will offer you the investment again in five minutes, and pay you one dollar for waiting. Elga claims that in this situation, it is intuitively permissible for you to delay your decision. Williams 2013 agrees that delaying is intuitively permissible: "After all, Alpha won't close off any of the rival options, and he'll gain a dollar whichever way he goes" (19). The problem is that Caprice entails that when you have some significant credence that you would act on a different sharpening later, it can be impermissible for you to delay your decision. In particular, any sharpening that you could act on will fail to sanction delaying whenever the small amount you would gain by waiting fails to outweigh the expected possible loss of your making the wrong decision about the investment later.
In response, Williams says that this problem for Caprice arises only if we neglect some standard assumptions about the rationality of agents. He says that when assessing the permissibility of actions, we standardly assume that agents are certain that they are rational and will remain rational. From this assumption, Williams concludes: "the credences induced by the sharpening [that entails that Alpha is Omega] will say that rationality requires investing; and hence (given that they assume that the agent will do what is rational) those credences will assign full probability to the agent investing" (25). In other words, the part of you that believes that you will survive the Cabinet also believes that you will accept the investment later if you delay, and the part of you that believes that you will not survive also believes that you will reject the investment if you delay. If we understand Caprice as saying that you may act according to any of these opinions, then it is permissible for you to delay your decision. Williams is cheered by this result, and ultimately this argument constitutes the response to Elga that he most prefers.
Unfortunately, this interpretation of standard rationality assumptions yields several unhappy consequences. For starters, the interpretation entails that you are rationally compelled to delay your decision, since delaying always has highest expected 15. Elga actually raises a problem for the combination of a claim like Caprice and the claim that your action must be randomly chosen from among the actions sanctioned by sharpenings. Since I am interested in assessing Liberal, I will present a version of the problem that constitutes a challenge to Caprice itself.
utility according to your conditional credence function, conditional on some sharpening together with the claim that you will later act according to that sharpening. But intuitively, it is sometimes permissible for you to just go ahead and accept the investment from the broker. Insofar as part of you can say, "I should accept this investment, namely because I will probably survive to collect on it," that part of you can also say, "I should accept this investment as soon as possible, namely because I will probably survive and there is a real chance that I will miss out on a great investment if I delay."
This intuition becomes stronger as delaying is accompanied by smaller sure gains and larger possible losses.
The simplest response to this objection would be to weaken the assumption that you must act as if you are certain of some sharpening and also certain that you will always act according to that sharpening. Perhaps we should assume only that you must act as if you are certain of some sharpening and also have at least some threshold credence that you will later act according to it. 16 Here is a precise proposal that could replace Caprice: consider the constraint that it is both certain that some particular sharpening is correct and also fairly likely that you will later act according to that
sharpening. We could say that an action is permissible for you just in case it maximizes utility according to your utility function together with your credence function after it has been updated on some constraint of just this sort.
This tempered proposal would allow you to accept the investment from the bro- But that means your decisions may not be appropriately responsive to your evidence.
Proposals that require you to act on sufficiently optimistic credence functions blunt 16. Robbie Williams suggested this response to me in personal communication.
the force of relevant information, such as facts about the likelihood and relative cost of your changing your mind.
The possibility of side bets raises a related problem. In the initial simple broker case, the proposal in Williams 2013 requires you to bet at any odds that you will either accept the investment and survive the Cabinet, or reject the investment and fail to survive. This requirement is counterintuitive; rationality should not mandate hubristic certainty about your decisions. It seems fine for you to hedge your bets, accepting significant side bets that pay off just in case you are making the wrong decision about investing. The permissibility of hedging is forcefully illustrated by other hypothetical decision situations. Suppose that instead of entering the Cabinet yourself, you are about to send your pet hamster Fluffy into the Cabinet. Fluffy is valuable to you, and ordinarily you would pay up to fifty dollars to ensure her survival. As Fluffy enters the Cabinet, you see that there is a lethal device attached to the exit door that will kill any creature that emerges. If it only costs fifty cents to disarm the device, it seems intuitively permissible for you to pay the fifty cents to save the creature that will emerge from the Cabinet. But if you are willing to pay the fifty cents, you are not intuitively also obligated to pay up to fifty dollars to disarm the device. As the price of disarming the device dramatically increases, you may eventually decide that it is not worth the money.
Another decision situation involving hedging highlights a final problem for Caprice.
The situation comes from Weatherson 2008:
An agent is told (reliably) that there are red and black marbles in a box in front of them, and a marble is to be drawn from the box. They are given the choice between three bets. α pays $1 if a red marble is drawn, nothing otherwise, β pays a certain 45 cents, and γ pays $1 if a black marble is drawn. The corresponding analog of Liberal is straightforward: in any decision situation, an action is permissible just in case it maximizes utility according to your current utility function and some member of the imprecise credal state.
This alternative decision theory is neutral about the nature of the imprecise credal state that determines which actions are permissible for you. There may well be additional bridge principles that constrain this imprecise credal state in light of your opinions about the relevant indeterminate propositions. For example, it may well be that if you are certain that some proposition is indeterminate, then you should act as if your imprecise credal state contains every single precise credence distribution over sharpenings of that proposition. On the other hand, we may sometimes feel compelled to say things like "it is determinate that you might survive the Cabinet, and determinate that you might not survive it, even though it is not determinate whether you will survive," in which case we may feel justified in eliminating only very decisive precise opinions from the relevant imprecise credal state. 17 17. In light of such bridge principles, one might worry about whether we are failing to distinguish action under indeterminacy from action on insufficient evidence. Williams 2013 rejects some theories of the former on the grounds that they do not assign a distinctive cognitive role to uncertainty induced by
The revised Liberal theory under discussion accommodates our intuitive verdicts about almost all of the §4 examples. For instance, some members of your imprecise credal state may be on the fence with respect to whether you should accept or reject the investment offered by the broker. Those members will prefer delaying the investment decision over making it, since you definitely gain something by waiting, and there is no cost associated with your making either particular decision later. Hence the revised Liberal theory allows that delaying your decision is sometimes permissible. In addition, the theory allows that simply accepting the investment is sometimes permissible, namely whenever your imprecise credal state contains members that are sufficiently confident that you will survive the Cabinet. Finally, it is permissible for you to merely pay fifty cents in the hamster case whenever your imprecise credal state contains members that have some credence that Fluffy will survive the Cabinet, but not enough credence to justify paying fifty dollars to save the creature that emerges.
In fact, many members of your imprecise credal state will normally have this feature, which may be partly responsible for our intuition that being willing to pay fifty cents but not fifty dollars is an eminently reasonable disposition. exactly .5 credence that they will survive the Cabinet, and yet rationally prefer getting a certain 45 cents over getting one dollar just in case they survive. Augmented in this way, the revised Liberal theory can accommodate our intuition that you may prefer the certain 45 cents, namely since such hedging will be rationally permissible as long as your credal state contains some sufficiently risk-averse members with middling indeterminacy. However, it is not clear that we should expect norms of rationality to distinguish action under indeterminacy from all other sorts of action. There are multiple reasons why your evidence could fail to determine the likelihood of some outcome. It may be that the likelihood relation is not well-defined, or that the outcome itself is not well-defined. The failure of your evidence may matter for the purposes of evaluating your action, while the source of that failure does not matter at all. 18. Buchak 2013 develops and defends this permissive alternative to standard expected utility theory. credences about your survival.
There are many further respects in which Liberal may be revised and expanded.
For example, we could use the mental committee model to represent your values in addition to your credences. For instance, we could identify members of your mental state with combinations of precise credences, subjective risk functions, and value functions. Then your having incommensurable values might be represented by members of your mental state having distinct value functions. Conditional values might be represented by dependencies between the credences and values of your mental committee members.
In addition, we could endorse more general procedures for deriving normative facts from features of your mental state. For instance, it may be that your permissible actions are not restricted to actions sanctioned by some member of your mental state, but instead include actions sanctioned by reasonable aggregations of the preferences of those members. For example, suppose that some member of your mental state is certain that you will survive the Cabinet, and some member is certain that you will not survive. Then it may be permissible for you to act as if you are not confident of either claim, not because your mental state contains some third member with this moderate opinion, but because moderate actions are preferred by some reasonable aggregation of your immoderate preferences. The same goes for accepting the certain 45 cents. That action may be permissible, not because your mental state contains some risk-averse members, but because it is preferred by some reasonable aggregation of your immoderate preferences. 
